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VOLUME 36 SPRING 1983 NUMBER 2
NET OPERATING LOSSES AND THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS: SOMETHING NEW
UNDER THE SUN?
PHnip S. ASHLEY*
Introduction
The right of taxpayers, both corporate and individual, to carry back'
and deduct net operating losses (NOLs)2 has been an important and
evolving provision of the federal income tax system since Congress first
enacted this tax benefit in 1918.1 In the years that followed, many special
rules, both statutory and in the form of Treasury regulations, revenue
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1. NOLs may be carried back to the three preceding tax years pursuant to I.R.C. § 172(b)(A)
and, since enactment of § 207 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
may generally be carried forward under I.R.C. § 172(b)(l)(B) to the fifteen years following the
loss year. The taxpayer must carry back the loss to the earliest year in which the taxpayer paid
a tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 172(b)(2), unless the taxpayer elects under I.R.C. § 172(b)(3)(C) to
only carry the loss forward. For carrybacks of longer or shorter than three years, see I.R.C.
§ 172(b)(1)(F)-(I). All citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless
noted otherwise.
2. I.R.C. § 173(c) defines a net operating loss as "the deduction allowed by this chapter
over the gross income." This opaque definition is hardly an aid to understanding, but such
vagueness is unavoidable because I.R.C. § 172(d) requires so many modifications and exceptions
in calculating the amount of the loss that a meaningful generalization is impossible. NOLs are
computed somewhat differently for corporate and noncorporate taxpayers, but in general terms
I.R.C. § 172(a) creates a deduction for the excess of deductions resulting from trade or business
expenditures over gross income. In the case of an individual taxpayer, however, some nonbusiness
deductions, including casualty and theft losses, can contribute to the calculation of a net operating
loss. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4).
3. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 204, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). NOLs in varying
forms have been enacted and repealed since 1918, but a carryback provision has been a perma-
nent fixture in the Code since 1942.
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rulings, and judicial decisions, have been developed that make the NOL
deduction an even more useful provision than when first enacted, but
the price for these generally beneficial changes has been greater
complexity.4 This complexity, however, may be a small price to pay,
for in these labyrinthine rules may lie an unanticipated possibility for
reducing one's taxes that has gone undiscovered for years by tax
practitioners.
This article will explore the possibility that the rules governing the
claim for credit or refund based upon an NOL may allow a taxpayer
otherwise barred by an applicable statute of limitation' to nonetheless
carry back the NOL to the closed year and recover a refund. In order
to bootstrap the taxpayer into this seemingly impossible result, we will
have to make a tedious trek through the twisted text of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code),' but the effort could be very profitable.
However, before attempting to break new ground with the special rules
regarding NOLs, a brief review of the general rules7 governing claims
for credit or refund is necessary.'
I. Claims for Credit or Refund Not Involving an NOL
Time Limits for Filing Refund Claims
In order to avoid having their claims barred by a statute of limita-
tion, taxpayers must file their claims9 within one of the two'I separate
4. For general reading in the area of NOLs, see Richman, Tax Planning for Corporations
with Net Operating Losses, 1980 U.S.C. LAW CENTER TAX IN ST. 3-1; Davies, The Net Operating
Loss Deduction: Inequity Among Taxpayers, 10 TAX ADVISER 530 (1979).
5. Claims for credit or refund based on an NOL may be barred by either of two statutes
of limitation, I.R.C. § 6511(a) or § 6511(d)(2)(A). Each will be discussed more fully in later
sections of this article.
6. Judge Weis expressed it as "slogging through the morass of the Internal Revenue Code .... "
Binder v. United States, 590 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1978).
7. See Baker, Procedural and Jurisdictional Aspects of Seeking a Tax Refund, 10 TuLsA
L.J. 362 (1975).
8. An original return showing an overpayment and instructing the Service to refund that
overpayment shall suffice as a claim for refund. In order to make a claim for refund after the
original return has been filed, the taxpayer must file an appropriate amended return. See I.R.C.
§ 6402; Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(b)(1).
9. If the taxpayer has already filed a return, he can make a claim for refund by filing an
amended return. Treas. Reg. § 1.172-1(d). Taxpayers sometimes file Form 1045 (Application
for Tentative Refund from Carryback of Net Operating Loss) erroneously, believing it to suffice
as a claim for refund. I.R.C. § 641 1(a), Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-1(b)(2), and Form 1045 itself specifical-
ly states that Form 1045 is not a claim for refund. See Crismon v. United States, 550 F.2d
1205 (9th Cir. 1977).
10. Additionally, there are other statutes of limitation for specialized types of refund claims,
such as I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) for NOLs, which will be explored in depth in part II, infra.
Beyond the scope of this article are I.R.C. § 6511(d)(1) for claims based on bad debts, I.R.C.
§ 651 l(d)(3) for claims based on foreign tax credits, I.R.C. § 6511(d)(4) regarding certain invest-
ment, work incentive, new employee, research and employee stock ownership credit carrybacks,
among others.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss2/18
19831 NOLs AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 255
time periods'I contained in I.R.C. § 6511(a).2I The first of these limita-
tions requires that the taxpayer file such a claim within three years3
of the filing of his original return.' The second possible time limita-
tion requires that the taxpayer file within two years from payment of
the tax.'" The reason that two different claim periods are helpful, even
necessary, can best be illustrated by an example.
Example 1
Assume a calendar year corporate taxpayer16 pays federal income
taxes of $100 for 1975. To be timely, the corporation must file its return
on or before March 15, 1976,1 and this is the date that triggers the
running of the three-year refund claim limitation period."8 Thus, to
11. I.R.C. § 6511(c) allows the Service and the taxpayer to agree to an extension of time
to file a claim for refund so that the actual time limit may extend beyond three or two years,
as the case may be. As extension agreements are not germane to the basic purpose of this article,
the discussion will assume that no extensions have been sought by or granted to the taxpayer.
12. I.R.C. § 6511.
Limitation on Credit or Refund
(a) Period of Limitation on Filing Claim-
Claim for credit or- refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title
in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by
the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from
the time the tax was paid ....
13. I.R.C. § 7503 provides that when the last day prescribed "for performing any act [in-
cluding the filing of a claim for refund] falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the perfor-
mance of such act shall be considered timely if it is performed on the next succeeding day which
is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. . . ." Moreover, I.R.C. § 7502(a) provides that
the date of mailing be treated as the day of receipt for judging the timeliness of filings.
14. The three years begins to run only from the original return and not from an amended
return. Rev. Rul. 311, 1972-1 C.B. 398.
15. Taxes are deemed paid on the date of receipt by the District Director. Republic Oil Ref.
Co. v. Granger, 98 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1952). See also Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658 (1945); Binder v. United States,
590 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1978).
16. The examples used throughout this article feature corporate taxpayers. However, the rules
illustrated generally will be applicable to individual taxpayers as well. Moreover, although these
rules generally apply to capital loss carryovers, this article will not discuss them further. Cor-
porations have been allowed to carry back capital losses for tax years ending after December
31, 1969. I.R.C. § 1212 (originally enacted as Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 512(g), 83 Stat. 487, 642).
17. I.R.C. § 6072(b) requires calendar year corporate taxpayers to file returns on or before
March 15, while I.R.C. § 6072(a) requires calendar year individual taxpayers to file their returns
on or before April 15.
18. This is true even if the corporation should pay its tax liability in full before March 15
or, in the case of an individual taxpayer, before April 15. I.R.C. § 6513(a) provides:
For purposes of section 6511 any return filed before the last day prescribed for
the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day. For purposes of
section 6511(b)(2) and (c) and section 6512, payment of any portion of the tax
made before the last day prescribed for the payment of the tax shall be considered
made on such last day. For purposes of this subsection, the last day prescribed
for filing return or paying the tax shall be determined without regard to any exten-
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recover the taxes originally paid the corporation must file its claim
for credit or refund on or before March 15, 1979, or be barred.'"
Further assume that on February 10, 1979, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice determines that the corporate taxpayer has underpaid its taxes
20
for 1976 by $5 and mails a deficiency notice to the taxpayer for that
amount.2 ' Should the taxpayer pay the additional $5 tax on May 4,
1979, a date beyond the March 15, 1979 expiration of the three-year
refund filing rule, it could then file a claim for credit or refund of
only this $5 tax within two years2 from the date of payment of the
additional tax, i.e., before May 4, 1981. Subject to the discussion in
Part III below, failing to file a claim by March 4, 1981 bars any refund. 3
It should be emphasized that the Code permits filing a refund claim
within the two-year period, even though the three-year period has ex-
pired, as in the example above. In fact, the two-year rule serves just
such a purpose. Without the alternative two-year rule, all taxpayers
with claims for refund of additional taxes24 would have to file within
the three-year rule even though, as seen in the example above, that
might be difficult or impossible.
Limit on Amount of Refunds Recoverable
In addition to the different time limits for filing claims under the
sion of time granted the taxpayer and without regard to any election to pay the
tax in installments. Further, I.R.C. § 6513(b) provides that prepayment of tax,
withholding and estimated taxes paid prior to filing are deemed paid on the last
timely filing date.
19. See the three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a), supra notes 12, 14.
20. The Service may assess additional taxes until Mar. 15, 1979. I.R.C. § 6501(a):
[The amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after
the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date
prescribed) . .. and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection
of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period.
This should not be confused with the three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a), which establishes the
taxpayer's time period in which to seek refunds. I.R.C. §§ 6501(c), (d), and (e) provide for dif-
ferent assessment periods for special situations such as where a false return has been filed, where
a willful attempt to defeat or evade " tax has occurred, where there is no return, and in other
situations. Of special note is I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A), which extends the statute of limitation for
assessment to six years where the taxpayer's return omits from gross income an amount properly
included therein in excess of 25% of the amount of gross income stated in the return.
21. I.R.C. § 6212(a) provides: "[1]f the Secretary determines that there is a deficiency in
respect of any tax . . . he is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by
certified mail or registered mail."
22. I.R.C. § 6511(a), supra note 12.
23. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(1) provides that: "No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after
the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) [supra note 12] for the
filing of a claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer
within such period."
24. Five dollars in the example. Of course, the additional taxes could be a much larger amount
and could even exceed the amount of tax paid with the original return.
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two I.R.C. § 6511(a) periods, there exists another crucial difference
between these alternative filing periods. The amount of credit or refund
recoverable is not identical for the two rules and is generally less favor-
able for claims filed under the two-year rule. I.R.C. § 651 1(b)(2)(A),25
applicable to claims brought under the three-year limit, restricts the
amount the taxpayer can receive to the portion of the tax paid within
the three-year period.2 6 In Example 1, this figure would be only the
$100 paid with the original return, not the total tax of $105 because
the additional $5 tax was assumed to have been paid on May 4, 1979,
a date more than three years beyond the filing of the original return.
I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(B),27 however, which is applicable to claims for
credit or refund under the two-year refund filing rule, restricts the
amount recoverable to the amount that was paid during the two years
immediately preceding the filing of the refund claim. Hence, the tax-
payer in Example 1 could recover only $5 under the two-year statute
of limitation. Thus, it should be clear that whenever the claim is filed
beyond three years from the date of the original return, the amount
of refund or credit recoverable will always be less than the total taxes
paid unless the original return erroneously showed no tax liability.
2
25. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2).
Limit on Amount of Credit or Refund-
(A) Limit Where Claim Filed Within 3 Year Period-If the claim was filed by the
taxpayer during the three year period prescribed in subsection (a) [I.R.C. § 651 1(a),
supra note 11], the amount of credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of
the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal
to three years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return ...
26. Rev. Rul. 118, 1966-1 C.B. 290 sensibly disposes of a potential problem caused by a
gap in the statutory interactions of I.R.C. § 6511(a) and I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A). I.R.C. § 6511(a)
requires a claim to be filed within three years of the time the return is filed in order to recover
the taxes paid on the original return. But where the claim is timely filed more than three years
from the date the return was filed, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) limits the amount of refund to the
amount of taxes paid during the preceding three-year period. This limitation could come into
play with the help of I.R.C. § 7503 (supra note 13), which allows the taxpayer whose last timely
filing date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday to file a claim for refund on the next day
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. I.R.C. § 7503 by its terms only refers to the
timeliness of the refund claim. It does not purport also to amend or supersede I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2)(A). Thus the claim for refund could be timely filed according to I.R.C. § 7503,
but because it was friled beyond three years, the limitation imposed by § 6511(b)(2)(A) could
render it virtually worthless. As applied to the facts of Example 1, assuming that the taxpayer
properly filed its claim on March 17, 1979, per I.R.C. § 7503, it appears that the taxpayer could
only recover the $5 paid in the preceding three years. The $100 paid with'the return is beyond
three years from the date the claim for refund was filed. Rev. Rul. 118, supra, concludes that
in order to protect the effectiveness of I.R.C. § 7503 the claim is considered filed on the last
day of the three-year period following the date of filing the return.
27. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(B):
"3-year Period-If the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount
of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the
2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim."
28. In the event that no claim was filed, § 6511(b)(2)(C) provides that the credit or refund
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
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II. Claims for Credit or Refund Involving an NOL
Federal income taxes are assessed" and collected0 based on an an-
nual accounting period,31 usually twelve months in length," and events
arising in one tax year generally do not affect tax liability for other
tax years.33 Over the years, however, Congress has enacted many pro-
visions to allow taxpayers to smooth out their fiscal peaks and valleys,
in some sense averaging income and loss over periods longer than twelve
months."
One of those sections is I.R.C. § 172,11 which allows taxpayers with
NOLs to carry those losses first back to the three prior tax years and
shall not exceed the amount that would be allowable under I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A), supra note
23, or I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(B), supra note 24, as the case may be, if the claim was filed on the
date the credit or refund is allowed.
29. See I.R.C. § 6201(a), providing: "The Secretary is authorized and required to make the
inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . .. imposed by this title, . . . which
have not been duly paid. .. ."
30. See I.R.C. § 6301, providing: "The Secretary shall collect the taxes imposed by the inter-
nal revenue laws."
31. See I.R.C. § 441.
32. I.R.C. § 441(t) allows a taxpayer to elect a 52- to 53-week annual period, and short
taxable years also. may arise in the year a business is organized or liquidated, upon the death
of a taxpayer, and in other ways.
33. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1931), wherein the Supreme
Court rejected the transactional approach urged on it by the taxpayer and upheld the power
of the government, under the sixteenth amendment, to assess and collect taxes based on annual
accounting periods. The Court stated:
A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and not in another. The
net result of the two years, if combined in a single taxable period, might still be
a loss; but it has never been supposed that fact would relieve him from a tax on
the first, or that it affords any reason for postponing the assessment of the tax
until the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite period, to ascertain more
precisely whether the final outcome of the period, or of a transaction, will be a
gain or loss.
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to enable the government to raise revenue
by taxation. It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue
ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such
a system is it practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods
of accounting, assessment and collection capable of practical operation. It is not
suggested that there has ever been any general scheme for taxing income on any
other basis. The computation of income annually as the net result of all transac-
tions within the year was a familiar practice, and taxes upon income so arrived
at were not unknown, before the Sixteenth Amendment.
34. Sections adopting a transactional approach include, among others, I.R.C. § 111, codify-
ing to some extent the court-developed tax benefit rule; I.R.C. § 172, itself allowing NOLs to
be generally spread over as many as eighteen tax years; I.R.C. § 1301-1305 allowing individuals
in certain circumstances to average a year's tax liability over the four previous base period years;
and I.R.C. § 1341, allowing one of two possible tax benefits in a later year for the repayment
of an amount erroneously included in the income of an earlier year.
35. One court, in describing the purpose of § 122(b)(1) of the 1939 Code, which was a
predecessor of I.R.C. § 172, stated:
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then generally forward to the next fifteen tax years where the NOL
becomes a deduction for the carryover year.'6 Of specific importance
to this article will be the special rules governing the claim for credit
or refund of overpayments in prior years created by the carrying back
of an NOL. These special rules can best be illustrated by use of an
example.
NOL Carryback Mechanics
Example 2
Assume that a calendar year corporate taxpayer had taxable income
of $1,000 each year from 1977 through 1979 but a $600 NOL for 1980.
The tax rate for these years is, for simplicity, assumed to have been
a flat 22%."
Tax Taxable Tax Taxes
Year Income Rate Paid
1977 $1,000 22% $220
1978 1,000 " 220
1979 1,000 " 220
1980 (600) " 0
In this hypothetical, the taxpayer may carry back the 1980 loss to
1977, the earliest year to which the loss can be carried, where it will
be treated as a deduction for that year. Thus, this new deduction will
The purpose of the "carry-back," "carry-over," privilege is to allow a taxpayer
some equivalent for the fact that he has not been able to reduce his tax by a loss,
because he has had no income in that year against which to credit it; and the only
practicable equivalent is by a fiction to treat the loss as a deduction from his in-
come in an earlier, or a later, year.
Commissioner v. Van Bergh, 209 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1954).
The first carryback provision was enacted in the 1918 Revenue Act. See supra note 3. The
Senate Finance Committee in discussing this historic change in the tax law, stated:
One of the most important provisions inserted by the committee is quite new to
our tax laws. At the present time no recognition is given to net losses; that is,
if in any year the losses and expenses of a taxpayer exceed his gross income the
excess (or in other words, the net loss) cannot be carried over into the next year.
For purposes of taxation the settlement must be made upon the basis of each year's
business of itself. The chief merit of the present plan is its simplicity of administra-
tion. But it does not adequately recognize the exigencies of business, and, under
our present high rates of taxation, may often result in grave injustice. The commit-
tee has accordingly incorporated an amendment [which provided that losses could
be carried back to the two preceding tax years].
Senate Finance Comm. Rep., 65th Cong., 3d Sess., S. REP. 617, at 7.
36. See supra notes 1, 2.
37. In reality, the corporate tax rate for the first $25,000 of ordinary income fluctuated be-
tween 22 and 20% during the years 1977-1980.
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reduce the taxable income for 1977 from $1,000 to $400.38 However,
the taxpayer paid taxes of $220 on $1,000 of taxable income and thus
has overpaid its taxes. It is this overpayment for which the taxpayer
will file a claim for refund of $132.3'
If the 1980 loss had been $1,000, the entire 1974 tax liability would
be wiped out, and the entire $220 in taxes paid that year could be
recovered. Further, in the event that the 1980 NOL had been $1,200,
the excess loss of $200 over the amount needed to reduce 1977 tax
liability to zero could be carried to 19780 and used to reduce the tax
liability for that year as well.'
It is crucial for taxpayers to understand that, like some other
deductions,42 NOLs are treated as having been carried back and con-
sumed in carry-back years for purposes of determining the amount
of NOL available to carry over even if the taxpayer neglected to carry
back the NOL in reality and cannot do so presently because the ap-
propriate statute of limitation has expired.43 Thus, a taxpayer may er-
roneously assume that although it failed to carry back its NOL to the
earliest carry-back year possible, it may now use its NOL undimin-
ished against the income of another year. Consequently, it believes it
has merely lost the time value of the money it could have received
by claiming its refund sooner. In reality, however, it has lost the abil-
38. For simplicity this example ignores several refinements and modifications I.R.C. § 172
requires. In reality, the taxpayer must use a two-step process: first, the taxpayer determines the
amount of NOL by modifying the excess of deductions over income from the taxpayer's trade
of business (I.R.C. § 172(c)), and second, the taxpayer recomputes the income of the carryover
year as well (according to I.R.C. § 172(b)). The NOL reduces this recomputed income.
39. $1,000 taxable income reported minus $600 NOL = $400 correct taxable income. $400
correct taxable income x 22% tax rate = $88 of correct tax. $220 total taxes paid minus $88
of properly paid taxes equals a refund of $132.
40. The manner in which NOLs are consumed is also a complex matter beyond the scope
of this work. It should be noted, however, that misreported items of income and deduction
for the carryback year, even if now barred by the statute of limitations, may affect the manner
in which carried back NOLs are consumed in the carryback year. See Phoenix Coal Co. v. Com-
missioner, 231 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1954); Springfield Street Ry. v. United States, 312 F.2d 754
(Ct. Cl. 1963); Rev. Rul. 87, 1981-1 C.B. 580 and Rev. Rul. 88, 1981-1 C.B. 585 revoking Rev.
Ruls. 218, 1953-2 C.B. 176 and 96, 1965-1 C.B. 126. See also Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281
(1932).
41. An NOL large enough to reduce the tax liability of the three carryback years could then
be carried forward to the next fifteen years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B).
42. A somewhat analogous situation occurs where a taxpayer fails to claim depreciation deduc-
tions for closed tax years. For future tax years the taxpayer may take depreciation based only
on the amount of adjusted basis that would remain had the taxpayer been properly depreciating
the asset. That is, depreciation allowable is always deemed to have been allowed and deducted.
See K.O. Lee Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 146 (D.S.D. 1968); Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-10(a).
43. J.G. Romer v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); B. Eisenberg, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) 333 (1963).
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ity to utilize the part of its NOL that would have been consumed in
the earliest carryback year had the loss actually been carried back. This
is, of course, a severe penalty to pay for inadvertence or negligence.
In Example 2, assuming a 1980 NOL of $1,200, had the taxpayer
failed to claim the carryback for 1977, which has now become time
barred, the taxpayer could only carry back $200 to 1978, that part
which would not have been consumed had the NOL been carried back
to 1977.
Special Refund Claim Filing Period
To make NOLs even more useful, Congress amended one of the
general rules regarding the time within which taxpayers must file claims
for refunds. As one court has stated," "Since the extent of operating
losses might not be known until the normal limitation period of I.R.C.
§ 6511(a)," had expired, Congress enacted a special limitation period
for net operating loss carrybacks in section 6511(d)(2)(A) .... ,6
This section creates a longer filing time by measuring the allowable
filing limitation period not from the date of filing of the return for
the year to which the loss is carried but three years from the time the
return is filed for the year in which the NOL arose."7 This will henceforth
be referred to as the special three-year rule. Example 3 demonstrates
the difference this special rule can make.
44. Mar Monte Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1974).
45. I.R.C. § 6511(a), supra note 12.
46. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A):
Special Period of Limitations with Respect to Net Operating Loss or Capital Loss
Carrybacks-
Period of Limitation-If the claim for credit or refund relates to an overpayment
attributable to a net operating loss carryback or a capital loss carryback, in lieu
of the 3-year period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a), the period shall be
that period which ends 3 years after the time prescribed by law for filing the return
(including the extensions thereof) for the taxable year of the net operating loss
or net capital loss which results in such carryback, or the period prescribed in subsec-
tion (c) in respect of such taxable year, which ever expires later; . . .
In the case of such a claim, the amount of the credit or refund may exceed the
portion of the tax paid within the period provided in subsection (b)(2) or (c),
whichever is applicable to the extent of the amount of the overpayment attributable
to such carryback.
This section was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 by § 5(b) of the Tax Adjustment
Act of 1945,. 59 Stat. 517, 524.
47. Pub. L. 95-628, § 8a, 92 Stat. 3627, 3630, created the special three-year rule, effective
for carrybacks arising in tax years beginning after Nov. 10, 1978. Prior to that time the limit
for the refund claim based upon a carryback was the 15th day of the 40th month, except for
corporate taxpayers for which the period was the 15th day of the 39th month following the
end of the tax year in which the NOL arose.
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Example 3
Again, assume a calendar year corporate taxpayer with the follow-
ing tax history:
Tax Taxable In- Tax Return"' 6511(a) 3-year49
Year come or NOL Filed On Refund Limitation
1978 Income March 15, 1979 March 15, 1982
1979 Income March 15, 1980 March 15, 1983
1980 Income March 15, 1981 March 15, 1984
1981 Loss March 15, 1982 March 15, 1985
Thus, referring to the table above, the 1981 NOL could be carried
back to 197810 and treated as a deduction for that year if a claim for
refund for 1978 is filed no later than March 15, 1985, whereas under
the former rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a), the claim would have to have
been filed no later than March 15, 1982.1'
Continued Applicability of General Two-Year Rule
As with the general three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a), the special
three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) does not affect the supplemental
two-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a). The special three-year rule only
supersedes the general three-year rule of section 6511(a) but has no
effect upon the continued and concurrent availability of the two-year
rule of section 6511(a). Authority for this proposition is ample.
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee states:
It is to be noted that the period provided in section [651 l(d)(2)(A)]
is to be in lieu of the 3-year period provided in section [6511(a)].
Section [651 1(d)(2)(A)], however, is not to affect any other period,
such as the 2-year period after the payment of the tax, within which
under present law claim for credit or refund may be filed .... 12
The Internal Revenue Service (the Service) agreed with this legislative
history in a revenue ruling 3 whidh addressed the question of
whether, in a situation where (1) the taxpayer has not petitioned
the Tax Court and no final judicial determination of his tax liability
has been made for the year to which the loss is carried, and (2)
claim for credit or refund is not otherwise barred, a claim based
48. See supra notes 17, 18.
49. I.R.C. § 6511(a), supra note 12.
50. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A), supra note 1.
51. Correspondingly, a 1982 NOL could be carried back to 1979 if the claim for credit or
refund were filed by Mar. 15, 1986 instead of 1983, and so forth.
52. H.R. REP. No. 849, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1945), reprinted at 1945 C.B. 566, 586.
Despite the quoted language, the two-year rule will not be available where the carryback year
has already been the subject of a final judgment. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i).
53. Rev. Rul 281, 1965-2 C.B. 444.
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upon a carryback filed after the expiration of [the special three-
year rule of § 6511(d)(2)(A)] of the Code, but within 2 years from
the time the tax for the prior year was paid ... would be con-
sidered valid.
The Revenue Ruling concluded that
[u]nder these circumstances such a claim [within the two-year
general rule] would be valid. This is so because the period pro-
vided in section 6511(d)(2)(A) of the Code was intended to con-
stitute an additional period within which a claim for credit or re-
fund of an overpayment of tax for the year to which the loss is
carried might be made rather than a substitution for the periods
provided in section 6511(a) of the Code.4
It is worthwhile to comment on the exceptional circumstances noted
in the ruling that render the two-year rule unavailable. When a tax-
payer carries an NOL back to a taxable year in which its tax liability
has been previously settled by operation of any law or rule of law,
then because of this prior settlement the taxpayer falls outside the two-
year rule. Thus, for example, the two-year rule will not withstand the
res judicata effect55 of a final Tax Court judgment,' 6 compromise,1
7
or closing agreement.5
54. Id. See Brad Foote Gear works, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.2d 894 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
55. See Blackmon & Assoc. v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9199 (N.D. Tex.
1976) for the proposition that res judicata will not bar or prevent the carrying back of an NOL
that arose subsequent to the carryback year that was the subject of a final court judgment. Thus,
an NOL arising after the litigation can be carried back to a previously litigated year and used
to reduce taxable income subject to the time requirement of I.R.C. § 6511 (d)(2)(B)(i). The court
stated:
Resjudicata is applied in the same manner in tax cases as it is in the law generally
.... Res judicata applies only where both the parties and the issues in a lawsuit
are identical to those in a previous lawsuit .... Res judicata, however, does not
have the effect of extinguishing claims which did not then exist and which could
not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.
Id. at 83, 377.
56. I.R.C. § 6512(a):
Effect of Petition to Tax Court-
If the Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency ... and if the
taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court ... no credit or refund of income
tax for the same taxable year ... shall be allowed or made and no suit by the
taxpayer for the recovery of any part of the tax shall be instituted in any court
except . . . [for three narrow exceptions not relevant here].
But see Mar Monte v. United States, 503 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1974); Family Group, Inc. v. United
States, 416 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i).
57. I.R.C. § 7122(a):
Compromises-The Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case arising
under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of Justice
for prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may com-
promise any such case after reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution
or defense.
58. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i):
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Moreover, when NOLs are the subject matter of the refund claim,
only the two-year rule and not the special three-year rule is affected
by, for example, a Tax Court judgment, closing agreement, or other
law or rule of law. This is because the special three-year rule is exemp-
ted from these disabling situations by another special rule, I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(2)(B)(i).5 9 This provision permits a claim for credit or re-
fund filed under the special three-year rule to supersede everything ex-
cept compromise agreements pursuant to section 7122.60 Thus, I.R.C.
§ 6511 (d)(2)(B)(i) aiid the special three-year rule permit a taxpayer to
carry an NOL back to a year where a final court decision, closing agree-
ment, or any other law or rule of law (except a compromise agreement)
has settled its tax liability, if the claim for refund based on this NOL
is claimed within the special three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511 (d)(2)(A).
However, all other non-NOL issues remain res judicata.6 '
By granting an extended statute of limitations for the filing of a
refund claim based on an NOL and by permitting the special three-
year rule to supersede any impediment including final court judgments,
the combined effect of sections 6511(d)(2)(A) and (d)(2)(B)(i) must seem
like an invincible one-two punch for the taxpayer. Yet the apparent
power of these sections can be illusory as at least two taxpayers have
discovered.
Mar Monte Corporation62 had 1959 taxable income consisting solely
of capital gains, which it timely reported in August 1960.63 In each
of the next three years (1960-1962) the taxpayer incurred NOLs as shown
below that could not be carried back and used to reduce 1959 income
"Closing Agreements-The Secretary is authorized to enter into an agreement in
writing with any person relating to the liability of such person . . . in respect of
any internal revenue tax for any taxable period."
59. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i) provides:
If the allowance of a credit or refund of an overpayment of tax attributable to
a net operating loss carryback or capital loss carryback is otherwise prevented by
the operation of any law or rule of law other than section 7122, relating to com-
promises, such credit or refund may be allowed or made, if claim therefore is filed
within the period provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph .... In the case
of any such claim for credit or refund or any such application for a tentative carry-
back adjustment, the determination by any court, including the Tax Court, in any
proceeding in which the decision of the court has become final, shall be conclusive
except with respect to the net operating loss deduction, and the effect of such deduc-
tion, ...
60. See supra note 57.
61. Treas. Reg. § 301.651 1(d)-2(b)(l). See also Hanson Clutch & Mach. Co. v. United States,
72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9303 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
62. Mar Monte Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Family Group,
Inc. v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
63. The taxpayer reported on a fiscal year ending November 30.
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because it had reported the taxable income for 1959 as long-term capital
gains."
Taxable In-
Tax Year come or NOL
65
1959 $51,500
1960 (15,500)
1961 (2,400)
1962 (2,500)
The Service eventually determined that the taxpayer had improperly
claimed capital gain treatment for all of its 1959 taxable income and
in October 1964 mailed a notice of deficiency"6 to the taxpayer assess-
ing additional taxes. Taxpayer responded with a petition to the Tax
Court l7 filed February 1, 1965, seeking a redetermination of the assessed
deficiency.
Following negotiations, the taxpayer agreed with the Service that
it owed about $21,000 of additional taxes for 1959 and a Tax Court
decision based on this stipulation became final on June 8, 1966.68 The
taxpayer paid the additional tax in April 1966.
Hoping it could now carry back the 1960-1962 NOLs against this
newly created ordinary income for 1959, the taxpayer filed a claim
for refund69 on November 23, 1966, which, in due course, the Service
64. As for the ability of the taxpayer to carry over the loss to future years, see United States
v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976), holding that where an NOL carryback cannot be
offset against a capital gain because the alternative tax was used [I.R.C. § 1201], the carryover
is "absorbed" by the taxable income of the carryback year. Thus, where the NOL is less than
the taxable income of the carryback year the NOL will be fully absorbed and there will be nothing
to carry over to other years. See also Note, Corporate Net Operating Loss Carrybacks "Absorbed"
by Capital Gains, 30 TAx LAw. 807 (1977); Comment, United States v. Foster Lumber Co.:
Net Operating Losses and Capital Gains-You Can Have Two, 'But You Only Get One, 25 CaEv.
ST. L. REv. 591 (1976).
65. These amounts have been rounded to the nearest $100.
66. See supra note 21.
67. I.R.C. § 6213(a) provides:
Within 90 days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6216 is
mailed... the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermina-
tion of the deficiency .... [N]o assessment of a deficiency . . . and no levy or
proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until
such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90
day . . . period . . . nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until
the decision of the Tax Court has become final.
68. A decision of the Tax Court becomes final 90 days after the decision is entered if no
notice of appeal is filed. See I.R.C. §§ 7481(a)(1), 7483.
69. The filing of a claim for refund is a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be satisfied
before a taxpayer may maintain a suit for refund. The filing requirement cannot be waived.
Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1976); Davidson v. I.R.S., 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
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disallowed" because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations.7'
Taxpayer then filed a suit for refund in federal district court.
2
The district court agreed with the taxpayer's contention that I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(2)(A) is a special rule applying to claims for refund based
on NOLs and that this special three-year rule replaces only the three-
year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a) and does not interfere with the applicability
of the two-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a).73 The court also specifically
found that the taxpayer had instituted its suit within two years of the
payment date of the additional tax, but concluded, fatally for the tax-
payer's case, that the two-year rule did not apply in this case.
The court concluded that because the tax liability of the year to which
the NOL was being carried, 1959, had been the subject of a now final
Tax Court judgment, I.R.C. § 6512 7 barred suits for refund unless
the exception accorded by I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i) 71 applied.76 Recall
again that the special I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i) rule allows suits for
refund based on an NOL to be instituted for years covered by final
Tax Court judgments only if the taxpayer files its claimed refund within
the time limits of the special three-year rule. The court held, correctly
beyond doubt, that I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i) has no effect whatsoever
on refund claims brought within the two-year rule, but does have effect
beyond the special three-year rule if a final Tax Court decision closes
the year to which a taxpayer might carry the NOL.
77
Thus, to have made a timely filing for a refund claim under the
(CCH) 9321 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); I.R.C. §§ 7422(a), 6514(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6502-2(b)(2).
Moreover, the government cannot be estopped from denying a refund pursuant to an untimely
filed claim on the ground that the Service mistakenly considered the late refund claim on the
merits. Melchior v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 193 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Thrif-Tee, Inc. v. United
States, 79-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9737 (W.D.N.C. 1979). But see Columbia Amusement
Co. v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Ky. 1964).
70. I.R.C. § 6402(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(2).
71. To be timely the taxpayer's claim for refund of 1959 taxes based on the 1960 NOL must
have been filed on or before Feb. 15, 1964. See supra notes 46 and 47.
72. I.R.C. § 7422(a) provides: "No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for
the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected... until a claim for refufid or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary .....
I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) provides:
No suit or proceeding under section 7402(a) for the recovery of any internal revenue
tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from
the date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders
a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of 2 years from the
date of mailing . . . of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to
which the suit or proceeding relates . . .
73. See infra part II and supra notes 52, 53, and 54.
74. See supra note 56.
75. See supra note 59.
76. See also Family Group, Inc. v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
77. Rev. Rul. 281, 1965 2-C.B. 444.
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special three-year rule and to have thereby become eligible for the I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(2)(B)(i) exception to the final judgment prohibition, the tax-
payer must have filed its refund claim prior to the end of each respective
three-year period from the date of each NOL filing: for the 1960 NOL,
on or before February 15, 1964; for 1961, on or before February 15,
1965; and for 1962, on or before February 15, 1966. Even if the tax-
payer had filed its refund claim on the day the Tax Court judgment
became final (June 8, 1966), it would have missed the final timely fil-
ing day for the 1962 NOL (February 15, 1966) by almost four months.
However, because the taxpayer did not even receive the deficiency notice,
which ultimately led to the creation of a tax against which the NOLs
could be carried back, until October 1964 (about nine months after
expiration of the special three-year statute of limitations), it would have
been impossible for the taxpayer to have ever properly filed a claim
for refund under the special three-year rule for the 1960 NOL, which
was by far the largest of the three NOLs. The taxpayer could have
protected itself only by anticipating an adverse Tax Court decision and
by filing a protective claim for refund immediately upon receiving the
October 1964 deficiency notice, but again this would have been only
partially successful for had such a claim been filed it would have only
been effective for the relatively small 1961 and 1962 NOLs.
Finally, the second paragraph of I.R.C. § 651 1(d)(2)(A)"s contains
another special rule, crucially important to the discussion in Part III,
which also applies only to claims based on NOLs. The legislative nug-
get contained in this section supersedes and modifies the I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2) rules regarding the amount of refund recoverable7 by allow-
ing the amount of credit or refund to exceed the portion of the tax
paid within the periods provided in I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). Without this
special rule, the special three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) first
paragraph would be worthless.
By way of illustration, assume again the facts of Example 3 above.
By using the special three-year refund claim rule of section 651 l(d)(2)(A)
first paragraph,80 the taxpayer can file for a refund for 1978 based
on the 1981 NOL as late as March 15, 1985. But without the special
amount recoverable rule of section 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph,8'
I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2) limits the amount of refund recoverable to either
78. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A), second paragraph provides: "In the case of such a claim, the
amount of the credit or refund may exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period provided
in subsection (b)(2) or (c), whichever is applicable, to the extent of the amount of the overpay-
ment attributable to such carryback." (Emphasis added.)
79, See supra notes 25, 27, 28, and part I, "Limit on Amount of Refunds Recoverable."
80. See supra note 46.
81. See supra note 78.
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the amount of tax paid within the three years preceding the filing of
the claim for refund or the amount of additional taxes paid within
the two years preceding the filing of the refund claim. In either case
this will usually be zero, and in any case the amount recoverable will
not take into account the deduction created by the carried back NOL.
However, by allowing the amount of refund recoverable based on an
NOL to exceed the I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2) limits, the taxpayer may ac-
tually recover previously paid taxes because of the NOL deduction.
This brings us to the final point of this article: how to apply the
special rule of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph when the claim
for refund is not brought within the special rule of I.R.C. § 651 l(d)(2)(A)
second paragraph but is instead brought under the general two-year
rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a).
III. Exploring the Uncharted
We have now arrived at the embarkation point for parts unknown.
Armed and provisioned with the rules dealt with in parts I and II,
we can begin to pick our way through uncharted, untried, and unlitigated
areas. Part III will focus on the question of whether I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A)
second paragraph and the two-year statute of limitations of I.R.C.
§ 6511(a) can be used in tandem to, in effect, reopen an otherwise
closed year in order to carry back to that year an NOL now barred
by the special three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A). Our inquiry
will be based upon the two crucial facts discussed earlier; one, that
the special three-year statute of limitations does not replace the alternate-
general two-year limitation; and two, that I.R.C. § 651 1(d)(2)(A) second
paragraph allows refunds in excess 'of the I.R.C. § 651 1(b)(2) limits.
In order to help focus the discussion, assume the following
hypothetical facts.
Example 4
XYZ Corporation is a calendar year taxpayer, which, as of June 1,
1983, has reported, in good faith, taxable income and loss as shown
below.
Tax Taxable In- Taxes Paid Before
Year come or NOL Applying Carryback
8 2
1976 $10,000 $2,200
1977 10,000 2,200
1978 10,000 2,200
1979 (6,000) 0
82. Assume a flat corporate tax rate of 22%. See supra note 37.
[Vol. 36:253
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss2/18
19831 NOLs AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 269
Assume further that XYZ has never filed for a refund for any year
based on the NOL for 197983 and now I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A)"I pro-
hibits it from doing so because the special three-year statute of limita-
tions expired on March 15, 1983.85 Conventional wisdom dictates that
the NOL carryback is lost forever-but is that really the case?
Refund of Voluntary Payment of Tax
Suppose that upon careful scrutiny of its 1976 tax return, the tax-
payer discovers a misreported item, which if properly reported would
have increased the taxpayer's tax liability. In other words, the taxpayer
discovers that it has gotten away with underreporting its 1976 taxes
because the statute of limitations on the government's ability to assess
and collect the underpayment has long since passed.8 6 Though its tax
liability remains, the taxpayer nevertheless has no obligation whatsoever
to pay an additional tax because of this error.
7
There are, of course, an almost limitless number of ways such an
inadvertent underpayment could arise, but for the sake of discussion,
let us assume that the underreported item stems from the taxpayer's
decision to expense the full $100 cost of an asset that properly should
have been capitalized and depreciated8 over a two-year period. This
83. While it must seem unlikely that a taxpayer would ever fail to carry back an NOL, in
a surprising number of cases both corporate and individual taxpayers have done just that. Reasons
for this failure to file include mistaken belief that the filing of a Form 1045 (Application for
Tentative Carryback Adjustment) constitutes the claim of a refund [Crismon v. United States,
550 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1977); Thrif-Tee, Inc. v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH)
9737 (W.D.N.C. 1979)]; mistaken belief that an extension of time to file the return also extended
the statute of limitation for filing a refund claim for claims filed prior to Nov. 10, 1978, when
I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) was amended to include extensions [Glenn v. United States, 571 F.2d
270 (5th Cir. 1978); Schneider v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Robinson
v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9162 (,V.D. Ark. 1974)]; mere negligence or
inadvertence [Oscar Meyer & Co. v. United States, 566 F.2d 1190 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Davidson v.
I.R.S,. 80-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9321 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)]; Family Group, Inc. v. United
States, 416 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the court noted that for this taxpayer the
statute required an especially high level of foresight and vigilance; and chronological impossibili-
ty; Mar Monte v. United States, 503 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1974), where the court upheld denial
of taxpayer's refund claim even though the result "does not comport with the common notion
of equity."
84. See supra note 46.
85. See supra notes 17 and 46.
86. The statute of limitation for assessment of an underpayment would have expired on March
15, 1980. I.R.C. § 6501(a), supra note 20.
87. No self-respecting tax article would be complete without paying homage to Judge Learned
Hand's dictum from Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934); "Any one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."
88. The Code requires that the basis of every tangible asset used in a trade or business or
property held for the production of income whose useful life in the hands of the taxpayer ex-
ceeds one year must be capitalized and recovered through periodic depreciation deductions. I.R.C.
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$100 deduction saved the taxpayer $22."' However, the savings should
have been only $11, for had the asset been written off over its actual
two-year life the taxpayer would have only been entitled to a $50 deduc-
tion annually for two years and hence the underpayment for 1976 is
$11.90
Suppose further that the taxpayer in 1983 voluntarily pays tax on
the $11 underreported item which, because the statute of limitations
on assessments and collections has expired, has now become uncollec-
tible. Having paid tax on the additional $11 for 1976, the taxpayer
can now file a claim for refund within two years of the time this tax
was paid per I.R.C. § 6511(a)9' and, in addition, the taxpayer's claim
for refund will seek to recover not only the $11 in voluntarily paid
taxes but will attempt to recover much more by carrying back to 1976
and treating as a deduction for that year the 1979 NOL of $6,000.
If successful, the NOL will reduce 1976 taxable income to $4,000,
resulting in a refund of $1,320.92 Success will not come easily, however,
for the Service will surely take a dim view of the taxpayer's belated
refund tactics. Following what will no doubt be the Service's refusal
to refund any money on the ground that the statute of limitations for
filing for a refund has passed,93 the taxpayer would bring suit for re-
fund in federal district court.94
In order to survive the government's defense that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the claim was not timely filed, 9
the taxpayer would have to show that the claim was timely filed by
prevailing on two issues: first, whether a taxpayer may make volun-
tary payments of taxes on underpayments on which the government's
right of assessment and collection is barred by the statute of limita-
tions, and second, whether the I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph
exception to the limitation on the amount recoverable under I.R.C.
§ 167; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a); I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. IV 1981). Prior to the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, only assets with a useful life of
one year or less could be currently expensed. Section 202(a) of ERTA, amending I.R.C. § 179
allows certain taxpayers to elect to eXpense up to $5,000 worth of property used in a trade or
business (but not property held for the production of income) acquired after 1980, for tax years
1982 and 1983 (with higher dollar amounts to be phased in later), despite the fact that but for
this section the taxpayer would be required to capitalize and depreciate these assets under the
general rules.
89. $100 depreciation deduction x assumed 22% tax rate = $22.
90. $50 depreciation deduction x assumed 22% tax rate = $11.
91. See supra note 12.
92. $6,000 NOL deduction x 22% assumed tax rate = $1,320.
93. The special three-year statute of limitation would have expired on Mar. 15, 1983. See
supra note 46.
94. See supra note 72. Jurisdiction would be based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1976).
95. FED. R. Crv. P. § 12(b)(1). See supra note 69.
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§ 6511(b)(2) applies only to claims brought under the special three-
year statute of limitations or, as taxpayer will contend, applies also
to claims for refund brought under the two-year statute of limitations.
Voluntary "Payment" of Tax
As for the first issue, the running of a statute of limitations on the
assessment and collection of a tax does not extinguish the tax debt
but merely prevents enforcement by the government.96 The same is true
of the converse situation where a statute of limitations bars the tax-
payer from claiming a credit or refund. The overpayment still exists,
but the taxpayer cannot enforce its claim.97
Authorities are split on the issue of whether a taxpayer may make
voluntary tax payments. No case has been found in which the volun-
tary payment was made after a statute of limitation had expired.
However, where a taxpayer made estimated tax payments for years
in which taxpayer had no tax liability the court in Binder v. United
States" held that these payments did in fact create an overpayment
that could be the subject of a refund claim. Nevertheless, because the
taxpayer failed to claim a refund of this overpayment until the ap-
plicable statute of limitations had expired, the erroneously paid taxes
could not be recovered.99
Contrary to the taxpayer's characterization of these payments as
"deposits" of "escrow payments," the court held that because the tax-
payer attached no conditions to the remittances they were in fact
payments of tax.1"' The court said: "Hence, when plaintiff or his
96. I.R.C. § 6501(a), supra note 20. The Code specifically contemplates that there will be
situations where taxpayers will pay taxes after the assessment and collection statute of limitations
has expired. I.R.C. § 6401(a): "Assessment and collection after limitation period-The term
'overpayment' includes that part of the amount of the payment of any internal revenue tax which
is assessed or collected after the expiration of the period of limitation properly applicable thereto."
Furthermore, I.R.C. § 6514(b), providing that "[a]ny credit against a liability in respect of any
taxable year shall be void if any payment in respect of such liability would be considered an
overpayment under section 6401(a)" prohibits "the Government from taking any benefit from
the taxpayer's overpayment by crediting it against an unpaid tax whose collection has been barred
by limitation." See also McEachern v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56 (1937); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S.
281, 283 (1932); note 130 infra.
97. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(1), supra note 23. See Binder v. United States, 590 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.
1978); Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9410
(S.D.NY. 1967); Shelter Island & Greenport Ferry Co. v. United States, 246 F..Supp. 488 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
98. 590 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1978).
99. Id. See also Jones v. Library Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1947), for the proposition that
even erroneously or illegally assessed and collected income taxes must be claimed within the ap-
propriate refund statute of limitations period or be forfeited.
100. Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658 (1945). Here funds sent to the IRS as protec-
tion from assessment of penalties but under protest were a "deposit" and not a "payment"
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employer paid as estimated taxes more than was rightly due, even though
nothing was due, he was making an 'overpayment of taxes' .. .
The Binder court also relied on the infamous triple negative of I.R.C.
§ 6401(c), which provides, "An amount paid as tax shall not be con-
sidered not to constitute an overpayment solely by reason of the fact
that there was no tax liability in respect of which such amount was
paid," as meaning "the absence of tax liability for the year in respect
of which payment was made does not affect the status of the remit-
tances as payments of tax." ' This implies that even though no tax
liability existed and hence no assessment by the government will be
made, these payments may constitute an overpayment nevertheless.
Moreover, in an earlier case, Shelter Island & Greenport Ferry v.
United States,' where a taxpayer, unaware that an excise tax for which
it had been making quarterly payments had been repealed, but made
remittances, the court held that these mistakenly paid "taxes" were
payments of tax which created overpayments. Specifically the court said:
The statutes certainly do not contemplate specifically payment
and refund of repealed taxes, but they are of general application
and are as well adapted to deal with the special case of the mistaken-
ly paid repealed tax as with the general case of overpayments of
unrepealed taxes. If repealed taxes paid by mistake are within the
circuit of the tax refund sections at all, there appears to be no
reason why they should not operate in that circuit of sections
precisely as would an overpaid unrepealed tax.
10 4
Furthermore, the court in a later case, Girard Trust Bank v. United
States, '5 interpreted I.R.C. § 6401(c) to mean that an amount paid
of tax and hence did not begin the running of the statute of limitation. The case has come to
stand for the rule that a conditional remittance lacks "payment" status.
Lack of "payment" status can create other problems beyond fixing the commencement of
the statute of limitation. It can also affect the amount of refund recoverable should the claim
be timely. This is because I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) provides that the amount recoverable cannot
"exceed the portion of the tax paid within" the preceding three years plus extensions of the
time the return was filed. Thus, where remittances do not become "payments" until more than
three years (plus extensions) past the date of filing the return, no amount could be recovered.
Budd Co. v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 10,051 (3d Cir. 1957); Fortugno v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C. 316 (1963).
101. Binder v. United States, 590 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1978).
102. Id., quoting Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 26,
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
103. 246 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
104. Id. at 491.
105. 81-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 13,394 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (emphasis by the court). In the spirit
of the Rosenman holding, 323 U.S. 658 (1945), the court went on to note: "On the other hand,
one may not unilaterally establish an 'overpayment' by the 'deposit' of money with the district
director in 'payment' of an amount designed as a 'tax.' 'Liability' and amounts 'due' normally
depend upon 'assessment', and the latter is entirely a Government, not a taxpayer, function."
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as tax may constitute an "overpayment" even though there was no
tax "liability" in respect of which such amount was paid.
Our hypothetical taxpayer who wishes to make voluntary tax pay-
ments and thus trigger the general two-year refund statute will surely
be heartened by the authorities just quoted. If both a payment by
mistake of repealed taxes or a payment where there is no tax liability
create overpayments that can be the subject of refund claims, then
why treat voluntary payments after a statute of limitations has expired
differently? In both cases no tax liability exists. What Binder and
Chemical Bank seem to be focusing on is not whether there is an
underlying tax liability, but whether the remittance is a "payment"
or merely a "deposit."
'10 6
However, before the hypothetical taxpayer becomes too complacent,
there is another point of view expressed in case law. In discussing I.R.C.
§ 6401(c), the court in Girard Trust Bank v. United States,'°7 in a
somewhat cryptic opinion, required an assessment before an overpay-
ment can arise. It held:
In fact, under the provisions of section 6401(c), an amount paid
as tax may constitute an "overpayment" even though there was
no tax "liability" in respect of which such amount was paid. On
the other hand, one may not unilaterally establish an "overpay-
ment" by the "deposit" of money with the district director in "pay-
ment" of an amount designated as a "tax." "Liability" and
amounts "due" normally depend upon "assessment," and the latter
is entirely a Government, not a taxpayer, function.108
Moreover, Judge Weis, dissenting in Binder, also argued that "sending
money to the IRS is not necessarily a 'payment,' " and he read Rosen-
man to require that "a concrete event, such as a prior assessment of
liability to the IRS, would be necessary to transform a mere deposit
of funds into a payment of taxes."'0 9
And finally, the Tax Court denied the taxpayer's claim that remit-
tances in excess of its liability made to forestall a jeopardy assessment
were "payments" until there has been an assessment.'0 The court held:
The rule adhered to by this Court, which rule also represents the
weight of authority, is that no overpayment exists with respect to
a particular fund until all or a part of that fund has been assessed
or until the taxpayer acquiesces in the proposed deficiency or a
106. Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658, 661 (1945).
107. 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,394 (Ct. C1. 1981).
108. Id.
109. Binder v. United States, 590 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 1978).
110. Fortugno v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 316 (1963).
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part thereof and the deposited fund is allocated to the payment
of the agreed deficiencies.
Since no assessment was outstanding at the time of petitioner's
remittances if petitioners are to prevail they must show that their
remittances were made with the intention of satisfying an asserted
tax liability.'"I
Furthermore, the Tax Court specifically disagreed with the Court
of Claim's position"2 on the proper interpretation of I.R.C. § 6401(c)
by holding that the section was "intended to apply only to payments
made in good faith and in fulfillment of a specific statutory duty. It
was obviously not intended to cover voluntary payments made prior
to any determination of tax indebtedness."13
The Service, for its part, has accepted voluntary tax payments without
complaint when the statute of limitation has not yet expired." 4 Hence,
if the voluntary payment is treated as a payment of "tax," that tax
can now be the subject of a claim for refund under the two-year rule
of I.R.C. § 6511(a) and must be refunded."5 Before considering the
111. Id. at 322. See also Charles Leich & Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 649 (Ct. Cl. 1964),
reh. denied, 333 F.2d 371 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
112. The Court of Claims position is expressed in Reading Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp.
598 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Hanley v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
113. Fortugno v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 316, 322 (1963). In interpreting I.R.C. § 6401(c),
the Tax Court noted the following legislative history:
We believe petitioners' reliance upon section 6401(c) is misplaced. Section 3770(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which is the predecessor to section 6401(c),
was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 by the Current Tax Payment
Act of 1943. The latter act was designed primarily to collect taxes from wage earners
and certain self-employed individuals as the income was earned and thus impose
a duty upon taxpayers to make payments before their actual tax liability became
defined. The legislative history of section 3770(c) indicates that Congress was cogni-
zant of the fact that since taxpayers were not required to make payments to the
Government before their liability was actually known, a situation could easily arise
whereby a taxpayer might pay amounts to the Government in excess of his true
liability. At this same time Congress was also aware of a current belief, which
had been engendered by certain court decisions, that a payment could not result
in an overpayment if no tax liability actually existed. As a result of these cases,
doubts were being expressed that withholdings or estimated tax payments in excess
of the tax liability even though made in good faith would not be overpayments
and consequently would not earn interest. To put these doubts to rest, Congress
added section (c) and (d) to the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943.
114. This is similar to what the taxpayer did in General Dynamics Corp. v. United States,
562 F.2d 1201 (Ct. Cl. 1977). The taxpayer had been using its foreign tax payments as credits
instead of deductions. It later became more advantageous for the taxpayer to change its election
and treat the payments as deductions. Thus, the taxpayer filed amended returns and paid addi-
tional taxes for those years, and the Internal Revenue Service did not protest this procedure.
Moreover, a payment of tax may be an overpayment even if no tax liability exists. I.R.C. § 6401(c).
115. This assumes that the taxpayer has an underreported item in the carryback year to sup-
port a voluntary payment of tax on which to base the two-year refund claim.
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second and final issue, recall that the special three-year limitation of
I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) does not supplant the two-year rule, 616 and that
the Service expressly agrees that the two-year statute of limitations claim
period is also available to taxpayers whose refund claims are based
on NOLs."17
Amount Recoverable In Excess of General Limits
The final issue centers on the amount recoverable. Recall that the
general discussion, supra, revealed that, normally, when using the two-
year statute of limitations, only the amount of tax paid within the prior
two years can be recovered."8 If that rule were to be applied here,
the taxpayer could only recover the $11 of taxes voluntarily paid, which
gains nothing.
To derive any tax benefit from the 1979 NOL the taxpayer must
prevail in its assertion that I.R.C. § 651 1(d)(2)(A) second paragraph'"
applies. Recall that that section provides a special rule when dealing
with refunds based on NOL carrybacks. It allows the taxpayer to
re..over an amount in excess of the I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2) limits on the
amount of taxes paid in the prior two years. If this section also applies
to claims brought under the general two-year statute, the taxpayer can
now use the 1979 NOL as a deduction for the 1976 tax year. In the
example (Example 4), this would reduce 1976 taxable income to $4,000
- and result in a refund to the taxpayer of $1,320.120
In order for the government to prevail, it will have to take the posi-
tion that section 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph was meant to apply
only to claims brought under the special three-year statute of limita-
tions and not to claims under the two-year rule. If the government
wins this argument, then the special exemption from the amount recover-
able limitations of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i) will be unavailable to the
taxpayer, limiting the taxpayer's recovery to the $11 voluntarily paid.
This may be a hard burden for the government to carry because
that section is phrased "In the case of such a claim. . . ." Interpreting
the meaning of the word "such" is crucial. It seems to refer back to
the first paragraph of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A), which in turn concerns
itself with whether a claim for credit or refund relates to any overpay-
ment attributable to an NOL and not with whether the claim is brought
under the special three-year or the two-year rule. Moreover, the second
116. See discussion in part I and supra notes 44 and 52.
117. Rev. Rul. 281, 1965-2 C.B. 444.
118. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(i)(B), supra note 27.
119. See supra note 78.
120. $6,000 carryback NOL deduction x 22% assumed tax rate = $1,320 refund.
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paragraph of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) refers to I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2),'2'
which is the general section setting up the various restrictions on the
amount of refund allowable. It seems logical to infer that if Congress
wished to limit the I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph excess
amount recoverable exception only to claims brought under the special
three-year rule, it would have made the latter amount limitation refer
not to (b)(2) generally but to (b)(2)(A) specifically, the rule where the
claim is brought within three years. By failing to restrict the reference,
it appears that I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph was meant
to supersede the I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(B) limitation as well as the I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2)(A) amount recoverable limitation.
The regulations follow this interpretation,"'2 and the House Com-
mittee report on the predecessor to I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) refers to
limitations on the amount of claims based on a carryback: "In the
case of such a claim, that portion of the overpayment which is at-
tributable to a carryback may be credited or refunded without regard
to the date of payment of the tax."'' 23 Further, the House Committee
report concluded that the amendment (bringing section 6511 (d)(2)(A)
into the Code) was intended to "assure that taxpayers will have an
opportunity to claim carryback adjustments in some instances where,
under existing law, they would be prevented by the statute of
* limitations." 
24
Thus there is no authority for the proposition that section
6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph does not also provide an amount
recoverable exception for claims brought under the two-year rule. In
fact, the weight of interpretive evidence supports the taxpayer's con-
tention that it does provide that exception. Hence, taxpayer may
recover-in addition to the refunded voluntarily paid tax-an addi-
tional tax refund because of the carryback on the 1979 NOL.
Possible Complications
Should the taxpayer prevail on these two issues, there are, however,
two other possible problems that could make it possible for the govern-
ment to yet reduce or deny' the taxpayer's refund. The first problem
was ignored in the above example, but, of course, cannot be overlooked
in reality. Where the tax liability of the year to which the NOL will
121. I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2), entitled "Limit on Amount of Credit or Refund," is the general
heading under which fall the special rules of subsections (A), (B), and (C), supra notes 25, 27,
and 28, respectively.
122. Treas. Reg. § 301.6511(d)-2(a)(2).
123. H.R. REP. No. 849, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1945).
124. The predecessor of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) was added to the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 by § 5(b) of the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 517, 524.
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be carried (1976 in the example) has once been the subject of a final
court judgment, the taxpayer is precluded from bringing a claim for
refund or a further court action.'25 The Code does provide some narrow
exceptions.'a6 Additionally, I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i)'27 specifically allows
an NOL to be carried back to the year in which a final court judgment
has been entered if, and only if, the claim for refund based on the
NOL has been timely filed under the special three-year rule and no other..
The hypothetical corporate taxpayer XYZ missed the special three-
year rule and therefore had to rely on the two-year rule. Therefore,
it was unable to qualify for the special treatment of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i)
and thus its claim for refund failed.'12 Because I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(B)(i)
specifically cannot apply where the year to which the NOL will be car-
ried back is subject to a closing agreement, filing a claim for refund
under the special three-year statute of limitations in this situation will
also fall.
The other possible problem revolves around the additional right of
the government to reexamine the tax return for the carryback year.
As there can be no refund unless there has been an overpayment,'
2
9
the government will reaudit the refund year with the hope of finding
other misreported items that resulted in underpayment.3 ' This would
125. I.R.C. § 6512(a), supra note 56.
126. I.R.C. § 6512(a)(1)-(3) provides three narrow exceptions not relevant here. I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(2)(B)(i), supra note 59, is also an exception to I.R.C. § 6512(a) in certain cases but
also is not relevant here.
127. See supra note 59.
128. Mar Monte Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1974).
129. I.R.C. § 6211(a) provides a concise definition of a "deficiency," but there is no cor-
respondingly concise definition of "overpayment." I.R.C. § 6401(a) merely informs us that "the
term 'overpayment' includes that part bf the amount of the payment of any internal revenue
tax which is assessed or collected after the expiration of the period of limitation properly ap-
plicable thereto." (Emphasis added.)
130. Justice McReynolds, writing for the court in the leading case on set-offs, Lewis v. Reynolds,
284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932), stated:
IThe ultimate question presented for decision upon a claim for refund, is whether
the taxpayer has overpaid his tax. This involves a redetermination of the entire
tax liability. While no new assessment can be made, after the bar on the statute
has fallen, the taxpayer, nevertheless, is not entitled to a refund unless he has over-
paid his tax. The action to recover on a claim for refund is in the nature of an
action for money had and received, and it is incumbent upon the claimant to show
that the United States has money which belongs to him.
The Court continued:
While the statutes authorizing refunds do not specifically empower the Commis-
sioner to reaudit a return whenever repayment is claimed, authority therefore is
necessarily implied. An overpayment must appear before refund is authorized.
Although the statute of limitations may have barred the assessment and collection
of any additional sum, it does not obliterate the right of the United States to retain
payments already received when they do not exceed the amount which might have
been properly assessed and demanded.
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mean that the taxpayer would have owed more tax had these items
been discovered before the statute of limitation on assessment and col-
lection expired.
While the government cannot reopen the closed tax year for the pur-
pose of assessing or collecting additional tax, it may reexamine the
closed year for the limited purpose of setting off, against and up to
the amount of the claimed refund, any underpayments it finds. These
set-offs could reduce the NOL refund claim to zero.3 '
IV. Policy Arguments
In the preceding parts of this article we have examined the general
structure of the Code for claiming refunds, but have found that the
interaction of these sections may give rise to results that Congress never
considered. The first court asked to decide what the Code allows will
run headlong into the "difficulties of so-called [statutory] interpreta-
tion [that] arise when the legislature had no meaning at all; when the
question which is raised on the statute never occurred to" Congress. "
How a court will interpret the sometimes Janus-faced language of the
Code is impossible to predict.' 33 Rather than speculate whether a tax-
payer will be-able to convince a court that the Code allows a reopen-
ing of closed tax years as described above for the carryback of NOLs,
we may more profitably ask whether this technique should be allowed
or prohibited. To the government this new refund tactic of the taxpayer
will seem like a gimmick or loophole through which the taxpayer will
bootstrap itself into enjoying a tax benefit that Congress never intended
to grant.
Even if a court should agree with the taxpayer's contention that I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(2)(A) second paragraph applies to claims for refund based
on the two-year statute, the court may nonetheless conclude that the
131. The Court in Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624, 628 (Ct. Cl. 1965) further explained
the holding of Lewis v. Reynolds, supra note 130, by stating:
In a refund action, the taxpayer cannot recover unless he has overpaid his tax.
It is not enough that he can prevail on the particular items on which he sues, for
he may have underpaid with respect to other components entering into that tax.
Only if the overall balance moves his way can he recover. His entire tax liability
under the particular tax return is therefore open for redetermination. The setoff
is one mechanism by which the government alleges that, looking at the particular
tax as a whole, the taxpayer has not in fact overpaid his tax.
The court went on to hold "where both the taxpayer's claim and the government's setoff con-
cern the same tax for the same year by the same taxpayer, the government's right to raise such
a defense is unconditional. . . ." Id. at 627.
132. J. GRAY, NMTuE Ank SouRcEs oF Tm LAW 173 (1921).
133. Apropos to the speculative nature of this discussion is a comment made by theoretical
physicist and Nobel Laureate Niels Bohr, who quipped, "Prediction is very difficult, especially
about the future."
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competing interest of putting an end to refund claims outweighs the
taxpayer's argument. For should the court uphold the taxpayer's right
to reopen closed tax years by making voluntary tax payments, there
will effectively be no statute of limitations on the carryback of NOLs, 34
and the special three-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) first paragraph
becomes eviscerated. This is not a result to be taken lightly.'
Terminating litigation and barring stale claims have been central goals
of the law of nearly every civilized nation.'36 The prescription of ac-
tions has found its way into the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence
beginning with the maxim Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,17 and
later and more directly through 21 James 1. c. 16. Today statutes of
limitation appear in codified'38 form for virtually every civil cause of
action.3"
Statutes of limitations are designed to accomplish three major pur-
poses: to encourage claims to be brought while reliable evidence and
witnesses are available; to put an end to the restraint on commerce
created by the uncertainty of never having one's affairs settled but always
skibject to legal attack; and finally, to punish those who have been
dilatory or negligent in the prosecution of their claims. Each of these
purposes must be examined in light of the narrow field of NOL
carrybacks.
Preserving Evidence
Regarding land titles, J. K. Angell said, "It is unquestionably the
natural tendency of time to obscure and extinguish the direct evidence
of title. Statutes of limitation are intended to cure this defect, and
supply the want of such evidence."' Continuing with regard to the
effect of statutes of limitations on contractual matters, Angell wrote:
134. This assumes that the taxpayer has an underreported item in the carryback year to sup-
port a voluntary payment of tax on which to base the two-year refund claim.
135. Judge Livingston has stated:
The Court disclaims all rights or inclination to put on statutes of limitation, which
are found to be among the most beneficial to be found in our books, any other
construction than their words import. It is as much a duty to give effect to laws
of the description, with which courts, however, sometimes take great liberties, as
to any other to which the legislature may be disposed to pass.
Fisher v. Harnden, 9 F. Cas. 129, 131 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1812) (No. 4,819).
136. J. ANOELL, LimITATIONS ON ACTIONS AT LAW § 8, at 8 (1854). See also W. BROWN, LIMTA-
TIONS AS TO REAL PROPERTY ch. 1 (1869).
137. "It is in the interest of the state that there should be an end of a lawsuit."
138. The Internal Revenue Code contains many. See supra notes 10, 11, 12, and 46.
139. Criminal statutes of limitations are matters of legislative grace. See generally Note, The
Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier To Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L.
REV. 630 n.1 (1954).
140. ANOELL, supra note 136, § 10, at 11 (emphasis in the original).
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[I]t would obviously be the greatest injustice, to subject persons
against whom a demand of this nature is made of long standing,
to discharge it whether it be well, or whether it be ill founded;
because it is possible that it may have been already discharged,
and the evidence of the discharge may have been lost. It is admit-
ted, that a demand of this kind may be very old, and at the same
time be very just; but then it can be sustained, every demand,
without any reference to its staleness, may be sustained, which
experience has developed, would result in falsehood and perjury,
and consequently in great injustice. Everyone must be sensible of
the liability of a debtor to lose his receipts, or whatever other
evidence he might, at the time, have had of payment; and it must
be manifest, that there is much injustice in compelling him to
preserve the acquittances which prove the debt to be satisfied, after
a reasonable time.'
4
In addition to the possibility that tangible evidence will be lost or
altered is the fear that witnesses will either become unavailable or will
have forgotten the facts to such an extent as to have become totally
unreliable. Justice Story summed up this thought when he cautiongd:
It is a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a
presumption of payment of a just debt from lapse of time, but
to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of
the transaction may have been forgotten, or be incapable of ex-
planation, by reason of the death or removal of witnesses."1
2
While these quotations surely raise compelling arguments in favor of
strictly construing statutes of limitation, their force diminishes somewhat
when the action is a claim for tax refund.
Because the claim for refund is based upon tax returns for the year
of the NOL and for the three preceding years, and because the Service
keeps returns on file for at least six years,"3 all of the relevant infor-
mation will often be available. A search of the reported cases shows
that most taxpayers filing a late claim for refund do so within six years
of the year in which the NOL arose. Furthermore, because these returns
are in the possession of the government, there is virtually no chance
that they could be forged or altered. Unlike the typical lawsuit where
relevant evidence is often in the possession of the plaintiff only, in
tax refund suits the defendant government will normally have all of
the information it needs to decide the merits of the claim.
141. Id. § 11, at 12.
142. Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828).
143. Telephone communication with spokesman for Internal Revenue Service, Kansas City
Service Center, Feb. 11, 1983.
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If some information or other evidence becomes relevant to the re-
fund claim which the Service does not already have in its possession,
it must be supplied by the taxpayer or its claim will fail. I.R.C. § 6001
requires everyone liable for any tax to keep certain records, and the
failure to keep these records can only hurt the taxpayer.
Relieving Uncertainty
Commerce is necessarily impeded when stale claims are allowed to
hang ominously over one's affairs. This is particularly troublesome
with respect to title to land. Justice McLean, writing for the majority
in Lewis v. Marshall, made the point that "[n]othing so much retards
the growth or prosperity of a country, as insecurity of titles to real
estate . . .,,"
Without belaboring the point, private citizens and the government
do not always have the same interests in limiting stale claims. Par-
ticularly in the arena of tax law, while the corporate taxpayer would
be put to great inconvenience and hardship by allowing stale claims
to create uncertainty, any harm the government may suffer in its tax
collection effort would be negligible.
When a claim for refund is involved, there is none of the potential
complexity of a tort, contract, or title to land claim. No doubt it can
be argued that there may be some uncertainty on the part of govern-
ment economists and planners in that random and unanticipated refunds
would make budget projections less accurate. In practice, however,
the number and amount of NOL claims carried back to otherwise closed
years would be insignificant as compared to the enormity of the federal
budget and the inexact and unverifiable revenue and expenditure predic-
tions underlying it.'
45
By way of illustration, in 1979 there were 266,862 corporate returns"'
filed which showed NOLs. The sum of the net losses from all of these
returns totaled $9,454,825,000. ' 7 In the unlikely event that as many
as 10% of these corporations failed to carry back their NOLs on a
timely basis and followed our hypothetical taxpayer's course around
the Code's time bars, the approximately $1 billion refunded would still
not equal the amount of revenue the Treasury would lose if unemploy-
ment increased by 0.1%.141 The vast bulk of the taxpayers with NOLs
144. ANGELFS, supra note 136, § 9, at 10.
145. The Fiscal Year 1984 Federal Budget as proposed at page 4-3 anticipates revenues of
$659.7 billion.
146. The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for 1979.
147. This figure does not take into account losses reported by domestic international sales
corporations or by Subchapter S corporations.
148. Estimate contained in Fiscal Year 1984 Federal Budget as proposed, page 4-1 and follow-
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will claim them in timely fashion. While the cost in terms of budget
certainty and tax revenues is insignificant, the strengthening of cor-
porate capital structures would be of great benefit to the economy.
Punishing the Indolent
The third and final purpose for statutes of limitation is tied to the
second and serves to prevent stale claims from arising by punishing
the indolent:
The language of the civilians and of the commentators upon the
common law has been, that the dominion of things must not for
a long time remain uncertain so as to disturb the peace of society
by giving rise to innumerable and perpetual litigations; and that,
to prevent such serious evil, the indolence of those who are dilatory
in recovering their property, and claiming what is due them, should
be punished, and that those who are indolent shall impute to
themselves the punishment.
1 9
This approach has, no doubt, some efficacy as applied to many causes
of action. However, before imputing negligence or indolence to tax-
payers with tardy claims, one must remember that the Code is an enor-
mously complex, unartfully worded, and constantly changing document
that can leave even the most diligent taxpayer confused as to his rights
and responsibilities.'10 Many of the litigants who allow the statute to
run are not large or sophisticated corporations and possess little
knowledge of taxation, and many are individuals without the resources
of a corporation. Perhaps for that reason, such litigants make more
ing. The Fiscal Year 1984 Federal Budget as proposed (page 2-23 and 2-24) estimates that every
1% rise in unemployment will reduce tax collections for 1983 by $11.7 billion and will result
in additional costs of $3-5 billion in increased unemployment payments and other benefits.
149. ANGELL, supra note 136, § 9, at 9, 10.
150. In describing the 1939 Code, which is simple in comparison to the present Code, Judge
Learned Hand wrote:
The words of such an act as the Income Tax merely dance before my eyes in a
meaningless procession: cros-reference to cross-reference, exception upon
exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave
in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully con-
cealed, purport, which is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if
at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters
are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting
out that net against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recalling a say-
ing of William James' about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt
written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether
to the reader they have any significance save that . . . the words . . . are strung
together with syntactical correctness.
Hand, Thomas Walker Swan, 57 YAlE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). See also Eustice, Tax Complexity
and the Tax Practitioner, 27 TAx ADvisER (Jan. 1977).
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appealing candidates for a remedial interpretation of the Code than
do plaintiffs in other actions."'
Despite the level of one's sympathy for taxpayers who simply fail
to realize that they have an NOL that can be carried back until it is
too late, one must surely have sympathy for the handful of taxpayers
who become entangled in the interstitial wilderness of the Code and
who eventually discover that they could only preserve their refund claim
through superhuman efforts and uncommon diligence."' It would be
hard indeed to convince these taxpayers that a narrow reading of the
Code has not done them an injustice. Furthermore, they would argue
that they are not asking for a court, by judicial legislation, to turn
its back on the plain meaning of the Code but simply to apply the
Code as written.
Finally, the remedial nature of I.R.C. § 172 and its predecessors
that brought the NOL carryback into the Code must not be forgotten.
Often taxpayers losing money and generating NOLs lack sufficient
creditworthiness to borrow from banks and other traditional lenders.
Many of these taxpayers could weather their present difficulties with
an infusion of cash from the refund of NOLs.
Congress has indicated its awareness of the importance of this source
of cash to financially troubled taxpayers. Under I.R.C. § 6411, there
is a method for accelerating the NOL carryback procedure; the Code
provides for tentative carryback and refund adjustments and requires
the Service to act within 90 days on any application for a tentative
carryback adjustment if the taxpayer has included all pertinent infor-
mation and if the Service finds no mathematical errors.
Conclusion
Close reading of the Code makes it appear that taxpayers with NOLs
that have not been carried back and utilized within the special three-
year statute of limitation of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) may nevertheless
carry back these NOLs by voluntarily paying tax on any barred under-
payment in the carryback year. Then the taxpayer may file for refund
of the voluntarily paid tax, plus a refund based on the barred NOL,
under the two-year rule of I.R.C. § 6511(a).
For financially ailing taxpayers to rehabilitate themselves is in
everyone's interest, and an "old" claim for refund based on an NOL
can do that just as easily as a "new" NOL. Whether a court will ever
allow a taxpayer using this technique to recover what must seem like
151. See supra note 83.
152. Family Group, Inc. v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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a windfall must await the first aggressive taxpayer with a barred NOL.
The mere creation of a windfall, however, should not deter a court
from adopting the analysis suggested in this article, for it can be justified
by the statutory language and considerations of sound public policy. 
1 3
153. Congress may be strict or lavish in its allowance of deductions or tax benefits. The
formula it writes may be arbitrary and harsh in its application. But where the benefit
claimed by the taxpayer is fairly within the statutory language and the construction
sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic whole, the benefits will not
be withheld from the taxpayer though they represent an unexpected windfall.
Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 240 (1955).
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